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By David Hearne, Researcher at the Centre for Brexit Studies, 
Birmingham City University 
Touching again on a theme raised in a previous blog post, I want to 
re-examine the theme of “Break-up Britain”. From being a niche issue, 
growing awareness in the UK’s national press has meant that it has 
suddenly taken centre stage. In particular, polling data suggesting that 
members of the Conservative and Unionist Party (witness the name!) 
saw the break-up of the UK as an acceptable price to pay for Brexit[1]. 
No state has a right to exist and the UK is no different – historical 
continuity should not blind us to the possibility of dramatic future 
change. 
Where the earlier blog focussed heavily on conceptual issues and 
nationalism in general, here I would like to look more specifically at 
practical issues in the Scottish context, although conceptual concerns 
do raise some practical questions. To begin, note that Scotland voted 
far more strongly to remain part of the EU in 2016 than it did to remain 
part of the UK in 2014. As such, there is a very real possibility that a 
hard Brexit without any kind of Withdrawal Agreement might lead to 
the eventual break-up of the UK. 
Given these facts, it is unsurprising that polling data have shown a 
shift in Scottish opinion. How significant is this shift, however? All 
opinion polls have room for error – this is unsurprising. If you ask 10 
people completely at random whether they voted Leave or Remain in 
2016, finding that 7 out of 10 voted Remain (or that 7 out of 10 voted 
Leave) would not be surprising. In the real world, opinion polls survey 
far more than 10 people, but even with 1000 respondents some 
variability remains. 
As such, opinion polls showing that one side or the other are currently 
ahead by a narrow margin shouldn’t be given too much weight. Contra 
much of the press commentary[2], the latest opinion poll showing 
support for Scottish secession from the UK is actually not significantly 
different from a YouGov poll taken in April that showed a similarly 
slight preference to remain within the UK[3]. More pertinently, however, 
both are significantly different from similar polling undertaken last year 
by YouGov[3] and from the results in 2014. 
I make these points neither to support nor to decry the Scottish 
independence movement – they are simply observations of a largely 
factual nature. More pertinently, the closeness of such polls suggests 
that beyond “mere” statistical significance testing, minor shifts in 
opinion over the course of a campaign in addition to changes in the 
views of those currently undecided are likely to be crucial. Similarly 
important will be the exact nature of the franchise. If the UK has left 
the EU then this would appear to undermine the rationale for including 
EU citizens in the franchise. Equally, however, if one were to do so it 
is feasible that they would tip the balance in favour of an independent 
Scotland that would, presumably, seek to re-join the EU. 
A newly independent Scotland would face a number of interesting 
practical and conceptual dilemmas. Firstly, let us consider the case 
where the UK leave the EU without a Withdrawal Agreement in place 
and Scotland holds a second independence referendum early in the 
2020s, which is then won by supporters of independence. It is clear 
that a desire to re-join the EU forms a major part of the rationale for 
both holding a second independence vote (“something has changed”) 
and could form a significant part of any subsequent campaign. 
The challenge, however, is that as a result of leaving the EU with no 
Withdrawal Agreement, the UK would presumably have left both the 
Single Market and Customs Union. Given the predilections of Prime 
Minister Johnson, it is not unlikely that the “rump-UK” would be well 
on the way to agreements (especially with the US) that preclude 
easily re-joining these structures. This leaves the fledgling Scottish 
state in an unenviable position as it begins moves to join the 
European Union (and for the sake of this piece, I assume that 
accession under Article 49 would be fast-tracked, which is not an 
unreasonable supposition to make, Spanish sensitivities 
notwithstanding). 
Scotland (and England) would face imposing exactly the same set of 
border constraints that a “no deal” Brexit would impose between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The EU will (rightly) not 
accept violating the integrity of the Single Market, particularly in a way 
that will benefit a cantankerous ex-member state (effectively England 
in this scenario). Scotland is thus faced with the unenviable dilemma 
of choosing either a significant economic hit via a hard border with 
England or having to follow the policy choices of its English neighbour 
in a huge range of areas (including agricultural standards). 
There are those who would argue that such independence is scarcely 
worth the name – is a Scottish government that is effectively 
precluded from joining the EU by its English neighbour truly 
independent? Ironically, this position precisely and exactly mirrors that 
of Brexiters. Just as Scotland would effectively have to follow English 
trade policy and standards in order to keep an open border, so the UK 
would effectively be required to follow EU standards in order to ensure 
no border between Northern Ireland and the Republic (let us leave 
aside the alternative of a Northern Ireland only backstop, which would 
be analogous to part of Scotland having to follow the trade policy and 
standards of England with the rest not needing to). 
Just as, at present, the UK has a voice in shaping those standards by 
dint of its EU membership, so as part of the UK Scots have a vote in 
shaping UK-wide policy. Both England and Scotland would be faced 
with a fascinating challenge in negotiating the hitherto uncharted 
waters of independence. Conceptual issues would be raised by the 
fact that it is almost certain that some parts of Scotland would vote 
against independence even as a majority voted in favour. It’s 
particularly likely given the results of 2014 that outlying islands and 
the border region would vote in favour of remaining in the UK. 
As in the Irish case, we would be faced with the difficult question of 
how to best accommodate the wishes and needs of both border 
communities and the majority in the country at large. Again, whilst the 
notion of the “nation-state” and self-determination appears to have 
widespread acceptance in “the West” as the legitimate primary 
sovereign unit, such things are conceptually extremely fuzzy. Suffice it 
to say that all parts of Britain face difficult choices as they sail into 
hitherto uncharted territory. 
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